Sub signum coma – current view of chronic disorders of consciousness

Česká verzia

Authors: A. Škutchanová ¹; E. Kantorová ²; E. Kurča ²
Authors place of work: Klinika intenzívnej medicíny a anesteziológie JLF UK a UN Martin ¹; Neurologická klinika JLF UK a UN Martin ²
Published in the journal: Cesk Slov Neurol N 2019; 82(1): 19-24
Category: Review Article
doi: https://doi.org/10.14735/amcsnn201919

Summary

Chronic disorders of consciousness are a modern phenomenon. Recognising first behavioural signs of contact with the patient‘s environment after coma plays a key role in the patient`s access to extended treatment and rehabilitation, as well as in establishing an effective contact with the environment; it is also considered to be an important prognostic sign. Current western terms in comparison with traditional definition of apallic syndrome or the term coma vigile are more descriptive and precise. In recent years, new methods of assessment, which enable more exact evaluation of brain disorders were established. However, most of them remain experimental and lack clinical availability, which favours clinical testing using daily objects. Behavioural response assessment is the standard to compare results obtained with other methods of assessment. In our work, we present our view on our perception of a patient with a disorder of consciousness and an overview of current options in identifying the underlying organic substrate.

Key words:

chronic disorders of consciousness – state of minimal consciousness – vegetative state – wakefulness without answering – WS/UWS – MCS – apallic syndrome – coma vigile – diagnostics – behavioural correlate – examination methods

The authors declare they have no potential conflicts of interest concerning drugs, products, or services used in the study.

The Editorial Board declares that the manuscript met the ICMJE “uniform requirements” for biomedical papers.

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